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1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
“The U.S. government-civilian agencies and the DoD…lack training and 
educational programs…It is essential that multiple agencies employ shared 
collaboration, decision-making aids, and execution tools to assess, plan, and execute 
integrated operations.” 
      -- Defense Science Board1 
 
The U.S. military has extensive experience conducting stabilization and 
reconstruction operations.  This includes peacekeeping, nation building, infrastructure 
repair and a multitude of activities below major combat operations.  Unfortunately, for all 
the successes in traditional combat operations, the inevitable post-conflict phase 
continues to baffle U.S. policymakers.  Stability operations constitutes what Nancy 
Roberts refers to as a wicked problem, in which there is no agreement on the root causes 
of post-conflict instability and even less consensus on the solutions.2  This leads to long 
and costly endeavors for the United States and military personnel in particular.  For 
example, the past three years of military operations in Iraq has cost taxpayers 
approximately $220 billion with approximately $29 billion in funding for security 
assistance and reconstruction projects.3  Post-conflict environments such as Iraq 
frequently remain insecure even after the expenditure of large amounts of effort, funding, 
and lives.  The Defense Science Board’s Task Force on Transformation asserts that post-
conflict success will “require the leadership of the agency with the greatest stake in most  
 
 
                                                 
1 Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Transformation: A Progress Assessment, 
Volume 1. By William Schneider, Jr., chairman (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, February 2006), 25. 
2 Nancy C. Roberts, “Coping with Wicked Problems: The Case of Afghanistan,” in Lawrence Jones, 
James Guthrie, and Peter Steane, eds., Learning from International Public Management Reform (New 
York: Elsevier, 2001), 353-375.  Roberts’ typology distinguishes three types of problems: 1) Simple 
Problems have consensus on the identification of the problem and its solution; 2) Complex Problems find 
consensus on the definition of the problem but find disagreements between stakeholders on the problem 
solution; 3) Wicked Problems have disagreements between stakeholders regarding problem identification 
and an acceptable solution. 
3 Although there are numerous analyses of the cost of Iraq operations, see Steven M. Kosiak, “The 
Cost of U.S. Military Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan Through Fiscal Year 2006 and Beyond,” Center 
for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 3 January 2006. 
2 
operations – the DoD.”4  This work assesses selected portions of the Air Force role in 
post-conflict operations and hopes to begin a more robust debate on how Air Force 
resources can help decision makers. 
This thesis reviews how U.S. resources are organized for stability operations. 
There is little doubt that the United States can muster incredible financial and personnel 
resources for post-conflict operations.  However, there may be key aspects of the 
Department of Defense (DoD) that are being overlooked in the current organizational 
framework used for post-conflict operations.  Reviewing Air Force leadership and 
training resources may help to identify additional tools to improve the chances for 
success in stability operations.  The Air Force may possess resources that, if leveraged, 
could reduce risks to U.S. personnel and ensure that limited resources are used more 
efficiently. 
A. RESEARCH QUESTION AND OVERVIEW 
Stability operations constitute a growing mission area for the U.S. DoD.  This 
thesis reviews the potential contributions of the United States Air Force in particular, to 
determine how the Air Force might contribute to stabilization and reconstruction in 
places such as Afghanistan and Iraq.  Although the Air Force is not the lead agent for 
post-conflict operations, there may be training resources and personnel with unique skills 
and experience that could significantly impact stabilization and reconstruction operations.  
The Air Force’s On-Scene Commanders Course and Air Force Mission Support Group 
Commanders, who are primarily responsible for security and infrastructure of Air Force 
installations, are examples of Air Force assets that could be employed in stabilization and 
reconstruction operations.  The thesis is organized into three main areas: First, a review 
of post-conflict operations identifies major areas for improving U.S. efficiency.  Second, 
the thesis reviews Air Force training resources applicable in stabilization environments.  
The final area of inquiry is to identify Air Force personnel who may have training, 
experience, and expertise to address the findings of the literature and training 
assessments. 
The methods and assumptions the United States utilizes to organize its resources 
for stability operations continues to be an area of discussion for practitioners and policy 
                                                 
4 Report of the Defense Science Board, 25. 
3 
makers.  These discussions have identified three broad areas or gaps in U.S. effectiveness 
in stability operations.  First, there are concerns regarding the integration of civilian and 
military personnel, resources, and procedures.  These discussions focus on improving 
U.S. post-conflict capabilities through a better integration of civilian and military 
resources.  A second focus is on training and education for people involved in stability 
operations.  Although there are extensive calls in the literature for increased training, 
there is less consensus regarding the methods to be employed.  Third is a focus on how 
the military is structured.  These debates involve assessments of currently-existing DoD 
assets.  Much of this discussion involves how current military units and resources can be 
realigned for stability operations.   
After the major themes in the literature are assessed, the paper continues with a 
review of Air Force training assets to determine their applicability for stabilization and 
reconstruction operations.  Specifically, the Air Force’s On-Scene Commander’s Course 
is a possible method of increasing training for post-conflict environments.  This research 
will determine the course’s ability to satisfy key needs identified in the literature 
regarding post-conflict operations.  Perhaps more importantly, this research will also 
determine if the On-Scene Commander’s Course prepares students for key tasks in the 
area of stabilization and reconstruction and whether this course would be useful for other 
U.S. agencies with responsibilities in post-conflict operations. 
Finally, this paper asserts that Mission Support Group Commanders can provide 
critical skill-sets valuable in stability operations.  These senior officers possess skills that 
have been identified as gaps in the literature and represent a resource that could be used 
for a new mission area.  This work will assess the applicability these Air Force leaders’ 
duties for possible use in post-conflict operations by reviewing the Air Force’s Objective 
Wing Structure and duty histories of current and former Mission Support Group 
Commanders. 
The thesis concludes with recommendations for the future, specifically, a 
spectrum of assistance that could provide a framework to leverage Air Force assets to add 
to U.S. capabilities in post-conflict environments.  The findings suggest that there 
existing Air Force assets may prove beneficial to increasing U.S. success in post-conflict 
environments.  The On-Scene Commander’s Course is a training resource that answers 
4 
many of the concerns regarding the need for greater civilian-military integration and 
training and education of personnel involved in stability operations.  The Air Force 
Mission Support Group Commanders possess skills that will be valuable in post-conflict 
environments.  They are the primary senior officers responsible for security and 
infrastructures at their installations and they are perhaps the most capable at integrating 
the various response agencies typically involved in post-conflict contingency operations.  
This group of officers are also required to attend the On-Scene Commander’s Course as 
part of their duties as Mission Support Group Commanders.  Both examples appear to 
address the major concerns of the post-conflict literature. 
B. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES 
Information from five main sources will be reviewed to assess the use of Air 
Force training and personnel to improve U.S. results in post-conflict operations.  An 
extensive literature review will be conducted to assess trends and issues that frame the 
debate about improving success in stability operations.  This research continues with an 
overview of doctrine and policy to identify strategic-level guidance for U.S. agencies 
involved in post-conflict operations.  Third, the thesis reviews the On-Scene 
Commanders course from Air University to assess applicability for stabilization 
operations.  A fourth area of inquiry involves how the Air Force organizes its resources 
for security and infrastructure requirements.  This involves a review of Air Force doctrine 
and organizational structures to determine parallels for post-conflict operations.  The final 
area of inquiry involves an assessment of the career histories of Air Force Mission 
Support Group Commanders drawn from the Air Force Military Personnel Data System.  
This electronic database of job histories and qualifications will be used to determine the 
potential usefulness of Mission Support Group Commanders for stabilization operations.  
These senior officers may have job experiences that mirror some of the concerns 
addressed in the literature and may prove useful for thinking about how to select officers 
for post-conflict assignments. 
5 
II. IDENTIFYING GAPS IN U.S. CAPABILITIES 
A. CIVIL-MILITARY INTEGRATION 
Major works on stabilization and reconstruction literature tends to center around 
three themes.  First, many works are concerned with the implications of the civil-military 
nature of stability operations.  The different civilian and military cultures, operating 
procedures, and objectives of civilian and military organizations are potentially damaging 
to operational effectiveness.  Disparate organizations may not always appreciate they are 
working towards a common goal.  The mechanics of integration form a second issue of 
concern – that is, organizational structures as well as cultures may inhibit successful 
cooperation.  A final issue is how better civil-military integration can improve the policy 
making process.  This completes the civil-military integration cycle that begins with 
culture, continues with the mechanics of integration, and concludes with implications for 
making the process better.   
1. Differences in Cultures, Procedures, and Objectives 
In 2000, the RAND Corporation focused on differing cultures, procedures, and 
objectives of civilian and military components of stabilization and reconstruction 
operations in Strengthening the Partnership.5  The United Nations, Non-Governmental 
Organizations and other agencies involved in post-conflict operations have timelines that 
may be very different from those of the military, while relief organizations often remain 
in an area long after the military forces have departed.  This work notes a core conflict at 
the heart of civilian-military disconnects:  the military often comes across as inflexible, 
uncaring, and overbearing, little concerned with long-term policy.  Strengthening the 
Partnership identifies a convincing civilian-military disconnect when it asserts that relief 
agencies may have limited sympathy for the military’s concern for an exit strategy since 
relief agencies normally believe that sustainable improvement requires a commitment of 
resources and personnel over an extended period of time.  Although the work may 
overstate its critique that “most NGOs plan poorly or not at all,”6 this effort makes a 
                                                 
5 Daniel Byman, Ian Lesser, Bruce Pirnie, Cheryl Benard, and Matthew Waxman, Strengthening the 
Partnership: Improving Military Coordination with Relief Agencies and Allies in Humanitarian Operations 
(Santa Monica: RAND, 2000). 
6 Ibid., xvii. 
6 
forceful argument that there is a distinct cultural difference in the military’s centralized 
planning and NGO penchant for more independence and freedom of action.  Perhaps the 
best summary is found in the assertion that “on its own, the military cannot solve the 
coordination problems inherent in humanitarian assistance.”7 
Christopher Conlin’s “What do you do for an Encore?” and Scott Feil’s “Building 
Better Foundations” largely agree that there are distinct tasks to be performed by civilian 
and military institutions, but refocus the debate on determining transition points and 
processes.  Each stresses the need for the specific specialties of individual organizations, 
but asserts that the process must be integrative.  While transition operations from major 
combat operations to the post-conflict environment are vital to the long-term stability of 
an area, the process cannot be solely run by the military.8  Civilian solutions and 
cooperation are vital to the political solutions that can be effectively combined with the 
security provided by the military.  Although U.S. military involvement has been a key 
determinant to the prevention of further violence and deaths, true and lasting security 
must involve more than a narrowly-defined military task.9  It must involve a coordinated 
effort of military and relief agencies.  Johanna Forman and Michael Pan’s analysis asserts 
that the U.S. admiration for expertise operationalized into narrowly-specialized 
government agencies may be creating the civilian-military gap and integration problems.  
Their work also posits that a common vocabulary and frames of reference would also aid 
in creating a more integrated response.10 
2. Operational Results of Differences 
The second issue in civilian-military integration involves the mechanics of 
integrating civilian and military institutions.  Specifically, this area of the literature 
continues the discussion of gaps in the integration of civilian and military resources by 
moving from an acknowledgement that there are different cultures to how those 
                                                 
7 Byman and others, Strengthening the Partnership, xxi. 
8 Christopher C. Conlin, “What do you do for an Encore?” Marine Corps Gazette 88, no. 9 (September 
2004): 74-80. 
9 Scott Feil, “Building Better Foundations: Security in Postconflict Reconstruction,” The Washington 
Quarterly 25, no. 4 (Autumn 2002): 97-109. 
10 Johanna Mendelson Forman and Michael Pan, “Filling the Gap: Civilian Rapid Response Capacity 
for Post-Conflict Reconstruction,” In Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conflict 
Reconstruction, ed. Robert C. Orr, 116-125 (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International 
Studies, 2004). 
7 
differences are expressed in post-conflict environments.  Although Kimberly Field and 
Robert Perito focus primarily on security, police, and justice matters, they are correct in 
asserting that the military has two frequently conflicting demands as their current 
priorities are shifting from state-on-state kinetic conflict to stability operations11  First, 
the military must maintain its ability to engage in traditional warfighting while answering 
the growing call for involvement in stability operations.  Field and Perito assert that the 
military’s second problem is bigger: it must do a better job at integrating civilian 
organizations and capabilities.  They assert that although the military has sufficiently 
answered the first issue, the second problem results in ineffective U.S. post-conflict 
policy and procedures.  Their work holds that although stability operations frequently 
prevent the clear delineation of tasks, operational success will come only when the 
barriers are lowered between civilian and military organizations. 
William Flavin’s work focuses on gaps in civilian-military integration and the 
effect on security and reconstruction in post-conflict environments.12  He asserts that the 
lack of an interagency plan at the beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom created gaps 
in the security and effectiveness of relief organizations.  Flavin describes how “the UN 
encouraged many countries to engage directly with the Afghan authorities.”13  Flavin’s 
assessment is a convincing account of how a lack of central oversight and coordination 
can result in ineffective and inefficient policies.  It is also a sobering reminder of how a 
lack of integration can cause confusion and inefficient use of resources. 
Bruce Jones focuses on the two main problems in strategic coordination.14  First, 
there can be a gap between the people that negotiate agreements or procedures and the 
people and organizations that must implement them.  The second problem identified in 
Jones’ work is the problem of a coordinated response.  Specifically, there may be gaps in 
                                                 
11 Kimberly C. Field and Robert M. Perito, “Creating a Force for Peace Operations: Ensuring Stability 
with Justice,” Parameters 32, no. 4 (Winter 2002): 77-87. 
12 William Flavin, Civil Military Operations: Afghanistan (Carlisle: United States Army Peacekeeping 
and Stability Operations Institute, 23 March 2004). 
13 Ibid., xi. 
14 Bruce D. Jones, “The Challenges of Strategic Coordination,” In Ending Civil Wars: The 
Implementation of Peace Agreements, ed. Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild, and Elizabeth M. 
Cousens, 89-115 (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2002). 
8 
the goals of the different actors, and when the actors might agree on goals, the differing 
methods of implementation may cause problems. 
Michelle Flournoy takes a different and important view of organizing resources 
for success in stability operations.15  While Flournoy asserts that strategic planning is 
critical to developing a successful plan of action, she contends that the planning process 
may be more important than the actual plan developed.  Since no plan can ever remain 
intact throughout a campaign, Flournoy contends the important part in operationalizing 
post-conflict plans is to identify organizational relationships, capabilities, and 
disconnects.  Flournoy presents an important concept, because it focuses on relationships 
and not tasks, since the tasks will remain fluid.  Flournoy offers increased inter-agency 
planning and relationships as the best way to prepare for success in an uncertain 
environment.  This concept is important because knowing who to deal with can be as 
important as recognizing the problem.  This concept of integration can lead to changes in 
how policy is developed in the first place, which is discussed in the next section. 
3. Changing U.S. Policy Through Better Integration 
The final theme in civilian-military integration is how integration can benefit U.S. 
policy and influence stability operational procedures.  This area of the literature asserts 
that improvements can be made in post-conflict situations by changing the way U.S. 
institutions perceive each other and the stabilization task environment.  This completes 
the civil-military integration cycle that began with identifying cultural differences and 
continued with the gaps identified in the mechanics of integration.  The analyses in this 
final theme of civil-military integration discusses how to make the policy process itself 
better. 
In Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction, 
Robert Orr makes important distinctions between capacity and strategy in post-conflict 
operations.  His work asserts that while additional response capacities are important, 
increasing capabilities is not sufficient for stabilization and reconstruction success.  This 
view is important since it does not rely merely on calling for more funding, but analyzes 
the post-conflict task environment.  The planning process must be robust enough to create 
                                                 
15 Michele Flournoy, “Interagency Strategy and Planning for Post-Conflict Reconstruction,” In 
Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction, ed. Robert C. Orr, 105-115 
(Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2004). 
9 
the proper integrative environment and have a strategy to accommodate increased 
resources.  Orr posits that strategy must guide capacity, and that undirected capacity will 
only lead to inefficient post-conflict results.  Specifically, Orr identifies three key 
transitions in primary responsibilities during post-conflict operations: military to civilian, 
U.S. to international actors, and international to indigenous actors.  While Orr highlights 
the gaps in the first hand-off between military and civilian personnel, his framework is 
useful to think about the linkages between different organizations and their 
responsibilities. 16 
Andrew Natsios moves the linkage debate forward by considering the ideal 
relationship between civilian and military actors.17  Like Orr, he is concerned with 
linkages between civilian and military organizations and how effective linkages can be 
made more effective, observing that “the success of military strategy and the success of 
development policy have become mutually reinforcing.  Development cannot effectively 
take place without the security that armed force provides.  And security cannot ultimately 
occur until local populations view the promise of development as an alternative to 
violence.”18  Natsios offers nine principles for post-conflict environments and provides 
an opportunity for readers to appreciate the civil-military integration needed in each 
principle.19  Although there are clearly lead actors for some principles that may have very 
limited involvement for other actors, understanding their context and how they affect 
each other is critical to success.  While Natsios’ framework is useful in suggesting 
similarities between civilian and military organizations regarding the nine principles, 
more developed examples would make the argument stronger. 
                                                 
16 Robert C. Orr, “An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction,” In Winning the Peace: An 
American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction, ed. Robert C. Orr, 289-304 (Washington, D.C.: Center 
for Strategic and International Studies, 2004). 
17 Andrew S. Natsios, “The Nine Principles of Reconstruction and Development,” Parameters 35, no. 
3 (Autumn 2005): 4-20. 
18 Ibid., 6. 
19 The nine principles are: creating a sense of ownership with the indigenous population; promoting 
institutions for indigenous capacity building; ensure programs and institutions are designed with 
sustainability in mind; selectivity ensures that scarce resources are used in accordance with strategic 
objectives; assessment encourages the understanding of local conditions and that best practices are 
highlighted; results ensures that goals are clearly defined and are measurable; partnership promotes an 
integrated response with governments, donors, and the international community; flexibility ensures that 
personnel and resources are capable of rapid changes to operational requirements; accountability advocates 
the creation of transparency together with checks-and-balances. 
10 
Marine Major and Naval Postgraduate School alumni Karl Rohr provides an 
intriguing framework for civil-military integration and security-development linkages 
with his concept of progressive reconstruction.20  This model provides a useful example 
of how civilian-military integration can positively affect operational results in post-
conflict environments.  Rohr correctly identifies the often blurry line between combat and 
stability operations, asserting that the most effective stabilization operations are 
conducted concurrently and immediately as areas are secured.  Indeed, Rohr’s concepts 
support Sir Basil Liddell Hart’s assertion that “if you concentrate exclusively on victory, 
with no thought for the after-effect…it is almost certain that the peace will be a bad one, 
containing the germs of another war.”21  Rohr’s progressive reconstruction concept 
refocuses combat from a purely military enterprise to a joint effort of military and civilian 
organizations.  It holds particularly true that stabilization and reconstruction operations 
after the cessation of major combat operations require a closer coordination and 
understanding between military and civilian personnel, including their unique 
institutional characteristics. 
B. INCREASING TRAINING AND EDUCATION 
A second major theme framing the debates about improving U.S. efficiency in 
post-conflict environments involves a discussion of the role of training and educating 
people involved in stability operations.  Although there are extensive calls in the 
literature for increased training, there is less consensus regarding the methods to be 
employed.  There is an acknowledgement that U.S. institutions have failed to apply the 
lessons learned from previous operations to increase opportunities for success in current 
operations.  Another important discussion involves creating a training culture for 
improving stability operations. 
1. Failure of the “Lessons Learned” Concept 
The United States still has much to learn from decades of post-conflict 
reconstruction endeavors.  The dearth of institutional memory is a reason to emphasize 
                                                 
20 Karl C. Rohr, “Progressive Reconstruction: Melding Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare with Nation 
Building and Stability Operations,” Marine Corps Gazette 88 (April 2004): 48-50.  See also Brian G. 
Watson, Reshaping the Expeditionary Army to Win Decisively: The Case for Greater Stabilization 
Capacity in the Modular Force (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, United States Army War College, 
August 2005). 
21 B.H. Liddell Hart, Strategy (London: Farber and Farber, 1985), 353. 
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the need for better training and education for stabilization and reconstruction operations  
John Hamre, President of the Center for Strategic and International Studies and former 
U.S. Army Chief of Staff Gordon Sullivan raise an interesting dilemma: even when vital 
national security interests are involved, the United States relegates post-conflict missions 
to ad hoc responses.22    This means an inability to leverage all U.S. assets, making the 
response less effective.  This situation reflects Orr’s previous concern that strategy is 
limited by capacity.  Without a robust and consistently-applied strategic plan, post-
conflict integration will remain elusive and consist of isolated tactical initiatives that may 
work at cross-purposes.  Retired Colonel Lloyd Matthews makes a similar argument 
when he asserts that, while the United States has no shortage of analyses and insights into 
the successes and failures of current military operations, we seem unable to apply these 
lessons to improve U.S. post-conflict capabilities.23  The Fifteenth Annual Strategy 
Conference’s identification of a “continuing gap between theory and application”24 may 
be the best summary of the shortfalls in the U.S. ability to apply “lessons learned.”  
2. Creating a Training and Education Culture 
Many agencies and organizations in the United States do not value training and 
educational opportunities as much as the military.  Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Strategy Michele Flournoy asserts that “few agencies outside the 
Departments of Defense and State offer routine opportunities for training and education 
beyond initial, entry-level indoctrination and job-specific skills training.  The training 
culture that exists in the U.S. military is truly an exception.”25  Lack of a training culture 
prevents an organization from viewing education and training as a method of improving 
results and advancement within the organization.  Flournoy offers an interesting addition 
to the common call of more training for post-conflict personnel.  Importantly, Flournoy 
identifies the need to emphasize the “lessons learned” concept.  This theme is critical 
because it identifies a frequent failure in a two-part system.  First, the training culture 
                                                 
22 John J. Hamre and Gordon R. Sullivan, “Toward Postconflict Reconstruction,” The Washington 
Quarterly 25, no. 4 (Autumn 2002): 85-96. 
23 Lloyd J. Matthews, Winning the War by Winning the Peace: Strategy for Conflict and Post-Conflict 
in the 21st Century, Conference Report of the Fifteenth Annual Strategy Conference, Carlisle Barracks, 
Pennsylvania, April 13-15 2004. 
24 Ibid., 3. 
25 Ibid., 126-127. 
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must be improved.  But more importantly, the increase in training must be accompanied 
by a culture that is able to link current operations to past training.  If education and 
training are done in isolation and forgotten, then it is a waste of resources because the 
training has not made a difference.  This is why many organizations continue with the 
frustration of starting from scratch every time.  Therefore, a solution could include 
combining the military’s training culture focused on current problems with an increase 
ability to remember the lessons of the past.26 
C. ASSESSING CURRENT DOD ASSETS 
The final major area of the post-conflict literature involves how the military is 
structured internally.  Specifically, this theme involves how the Department of Defense 
organizes its resources and assesses its capabilities.  Much of this discussion involves 
how current military units and resources can be realigned for stability operations.  There 
are two areas relevant to this study.  First, there is a growing consensus that the United 
States has not correctly assessed the different challenges of post-conflict environments.  
As opposed to problems in applying the “lessons learned” concept, this involves 
matching and adapting U.S. capabilities to a new task environment.  The second area 
important to this study is to determine if appropriate guidance exists to direct the military 
sufficiently to organize for success in post-conflict environments. 
1. Situational Assessments 
The Army’s difficulty in stability operations is not a result of the Army being 
inflexible or incompetent.  British Army General Nigel Aylwin-Foster’s review of 
Operation Iraqi Freedom questions whether the Army is a victim of its own success.  The 
Army’s emphasis on conventional warfighting and adherence to centralized command 
may have held it back from the rapid innovation and flexibility required in post-conflict 
operations.  His assertions about flexibility and the need for a more adaptable leadership 
cadre could lead to substantive improvements in stability operations.27 
Leonard Wong’s U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute analysis of Army company 
grade officers in Operation Iraqi Freedom offers an interesting contrast to Aylwin-
                                                 
26 Michele Flournoy, “Training and Education for Post-Conflict Reconstruction,” In Winning the 
Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction, ed. Robert C. Orr, 126-137 (Washington, 
D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2004). 
27 Nigel Aylwin-Foster, “Changing the Army for Counterinsurgency Operations,” Military Review 85, 
no. 6 (November-December 2005): 2-15. 
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Foster’s work, and paints a picture of junior officers succeeding despite their 
organizational structure and lack of guidance from civilian leadership.  Wong’s work 
acknowledges the success of Company Grade Officers in the ambiguous, unpredictable 
and complex nature of the post-conflict environment.  While focusing exclusively on 
Operation Iraqi Freedom, Wong’s review finds that the U.S. military can provide a 
valuable resource of leadership that has a proven track record of initiative, adaptability 
and independent actions in the absence of a clear consensus or agreement.  Wong’s work 
is also important because it identifies the effect of ambiguity on the effectiveness of U.S. 
forces in post-conflict operations.  He asserts that being able to rethink the way the 
United States approaches current conflicts is a major barrier to post-conflict success.28   
The U.S. force structure was not optimized for stability operations. This may 
contribute to reluctance for the United States to be engaged in what is a long-term and 
expensive commitment during stabilization.  Thomas Donnelly of the American 
Enterprise Institute asserts that America’s penchant for stand-off weapons may contribute 
to the reluctance to become involved in operations involving mass or sustainability.  
Donnelly’s work is important because it offers a good example of how U.S. policy can 
become inflexible, or how previously successful procedures will be used irregardless of 
their true applicability.29  Patrick Donahoe of the U.S. Naval War College similarly 
asserts that a change in the way the military structures its resources is needed.  
Specifically, while the Cold War focused the military on traditional force-on-force battles 
and the need for officers trained to that standard, Donahoe argues the military now needs 
leaders that are capable of switching back-and-forth between major combat operations 
and stability operations.30 
2. Matching Taskings and Capabilities 
Writers focusing upon tasks and capabilities question whether there is sufficient 
guidance to direct the military to organize for success in post-conflict environments.  
Numerous studies have suggested frameworks for internal assessments, such as the 
                                                 
28 Leonard Wong, Developing Adaptive Leaders: The Crucible Experience of Operation Iraqi 
Freedom (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, United States Army War College, July 2004). 
29 Thomas Donnelly, The Military We Need: The Defense Requirements of the Bush Doctrine 
(Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute Press, 2005). 
30 Patrick J. Donahoe, “Preparing Leaders for Nationbuilding,” Military Review, 84, no. 3 (May-June 
2004): 24-26. 
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Defense Science Board 2004 Summer Study.31  More importantly, the U.S. military’s 
Universal Joint Task List provides the framework and lists the specific capabilities 
desired for stabilization operations.  This list is the authoritative guidance to organize 
personnel, equipment, and resources for post-conflict operations within the Department 
of Defense.32 
A key finding from a November 2003 study from National Defense University 
contends that the continuing problems in the military with post-conflict operations is not 
a deficiency in the required skill-sets, but in how those resources are not leveraged and 
collected effectively within the military.33  This argument asserts that the Defense 
Department’s difficulties are organizational, not financial.  Similar recommendations can 
be found in works such as the bi-partisan study sponsored by the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, which found that a coherent response strategy is not possible 
without a more robust assessment of already-existing resources and personnel.34 
The Defense Science Board’s 2004 Summer Study offers two dimensions for 
increasing U.S. effectiveness in stabilization and reconstruction operations.35  First, the 
study suggests that future improvements could come from leveraging the military’s 
management discipline.  However, it must be noted that the same management, command 
and control, and goal-oriented results that have been a hallmark of past combat successes 
for the military may need to be adapted to the new task environment of stability 
operations.  The second dimension regards the suggestion for a method to systematically 
analyze the knowledge and capabilities within the Department of Defense.  The study’s 
request for a full review of military assets matches this work’s assertion that a complete 
review of Air Force leadership and training assets has not been undertaken and may 
provide valuable resources to the larger Department of Defense effort. 
                                                 
31 Transition to and from Hostilities, Defense Science Board 2004 Summer Study (Washington, D.C.: 
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, December 2004).  
See also the addendum: Transition to and from Hostilities: Supporting Papers. 
32 Universal Joint Task List, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, United States 
Department of Defense, Publication CJCSM 3500.04D, 1 August 2005. 
33 Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations, ed. Hans Binnendijk and Stuart 
Johnson (Washington, D.C.: Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense 
University, 12 November 2003). 
34 Play to Win: Final Report of the bi-partisan Commission on Post-Conflict Reconstruction 
(Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 2003). 
35 Transition to and from Hostilities, 4-5. 
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While recent policy updates such as DOD Directive 3000.0536 have directed that 
stability operations be placed on the same priority as major combat operations, there are 
already examples of the U.S. military services being directed to organize, train, and equip 
their forces for stability operations.  The Universal Joint Task List is the authoritative 
strategic source for determining the tasks needed to accomplish the National Military 
Strategy.  Specifically, the Universal Joint Task List “serve[s] as the foundation for 
capabilities-based planning across the range of military operations.”37  Although many 
requirements described in the listing are applicable to stability operations, there are five 
tasks that this study finds particularly relevant: 
• Cooperate with and support NGOs/PVOs 
• Provide government-wide support 
• Coordinate activities within the interagency process 
• Conduct civil-military operations 
• Foster interagency relations38 
The literature discussing improvements in U.S. capabilities for post-conflict 
environments is extensive, but tends to center around three themes: civilian-military 
integration, training and education, and the need for internal realignments within the 
Department of Defense.  With these major literature areas identified, the remainder of 
this research will determine if there are any Air Force resources or personnel that can 
help answer these three issues.  This work continues with an example of an Air Force 
training course that may answer many concerns raised in the stabilization literature. 
                                                 
36 Gordon England, Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) 
Operations, Department of Defense Directive 3000.05 (Washington, D.C.: United States Department of 
Defense, 28 November 2005). 
37 Universal Joint Task List, A-1. 
38 Ibid. The following tasks are taken from the Universal Joint Task List: (1) Strategic Theater Tasks 
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III. INCREASING POST-CONFLICT TRAINING 
“U.S. personnel…rarely have an opportunity to train with the representatives of the other 
U.S. agencies, non-governmental organizations, and the international actors with whom 
they will have to work in the field.” 
-- Bi-partisan Commission on Post-Conflict Reconstruction39 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
There is no doubt that a continued U.S. military presence is required after the 
completion of major combat operations.  Military personnel have also seen increasing 
taskings for nation building and peacekeeping activities.  While there is little question 
regarding the preeminence of the U.S. in force-on-force battles with a traditional enemy, 
successes in post-conflict operations have been much harder to come by.  Since a 
superpower or peer-competitor conflict is a limited possibility for the foreseeable future, 
it is critical for the U.S. military to address its shortcomings in conducting stabilization 
and reconstruction operations.  However, defining success in stability operations as 
simply a “hearts and minds” issue fails to address more fundamental disconnects in U.S. 
policy and how the nation organizes its resources for post-conflict operations.  The 
following sections address four major areas in an attempt to synthesize the trends from 
the stabilization and reconstruction literature with an Air Force training resource.  The 
goal of this chapter is to assess the applicability of the Air Force On-Scene Commanders 
Course to stability operations. 
The first major section discusses the issues concerning civilian-military 
integration and training.  This review finds that the two issues are closely related.  
Improving integration and training can also address the military cultural issues that 
surround non-traditional roles for the military.  The next section provides a review of the 
military’s responsiveness to its core taskings in the area of post-conflict operations.  This 
discussion addresses the literature’s call for a complete review of DOD assets and how 
they are organized to meet the demands of stability operations.  The third major section 
seeks to create a discussion in the Air Force by determining if there are any training 
resources that can synthesize the concerns and trends found in the literature review.  
Specifically, does the Air Force On-Scene Commanders Course satisfactorily answer the                                                  
39 Play to Win: Final Report of the bi-partisan Commission on Post-Conflict Reconstruction, 16. 
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questions of civilian-military integration and increasing relevant training for post-conflict 
environments?  The final major area asserts that a spectrum of assistance could be 
developed that offers a scalable Air Force response to increase training in key post-
conflict skill-sets.  The current and following chapters begin to offer realistic options that 
support the assertion that anything less than a full consideration of all Department of 
Defense training and personnel resources means sub-optimal results for U.S. interests, the 
international community, and the exposure of U.S. personnel to unnecessary risks. 
B. MILITARY ROLES AND THE CULTURE OF POST-CONFLICT 
OPERATIONS 
The U.S. military has had extensive experience in what is commonly referred to 
as stabilization and reconstruction operations.  This encompasses missions such as 
peacekeeping, nation building, infrastructure repair and a multitude of activities below 
major combat operations.  Unfortunately, for all the successes in traditional combat 
operations, the inevitable post-conflict phase continues to baffle U.S. policymakers.  
Indeed, there is a significant gap between success in combat operations and the ability to 
control the stabilization phase.40  However, there is now a growing realization that 
constabulary functions should not be viewed as a diversion of scarce resources, but 
represent a key determinant of the ultimate success of armed conflict.41  It is clear that the 
U.S. military will be called upon to ensure an area remains stable, nation-building 
progresses and autonomy is returned to indigenous populations.  The U.S. inability to 
consistently perform in the stabilization and reconstruction realm should be viewed as 
seriously as its success in combat operations.  The observations of Carafano and Dillon 
succinctly summarize the key issue: 
The United States should be just as efficient in fighting for peace as in 
fighting battles.  Winning the peace is part of winning wars.  As in 
preparing for combat, sound planning for peace requires the right 
organizations, training, and preparation.42 
                                                 
40 Donnelly, 1. 
41 Michael Mandelbaum, “Foreign Policy as Social Work,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 75, no. 1 
(January/February 1996), p. 16. 
42 James Jay Carafano and Dana R. Dillon, “Winning the Peace: Principles for Post-Conflict 
Operations,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder no. 1859, 13 June 2005, 2. 
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There are currently two major obstacles preventing more efficient U.S. results in 
post-conflict operations.  These two obstacles may be largely responsible for the 
problems of civilian-military integration and training identified in the literature.  First, 
military culture and hence, military personnel perceptions of their roles in post-conflict 
operations must accommodate the realities of current missions.  Secondly, increasing 
civilian and military integration will provide increased opportunities for success.  The 
U.S. military is now actively directed to emphasize the mission area of stabilization and 
reconstruction.  Unfortunately, the U.S. military’s flexibility in changing from combat to 
stability operations and its integration with civilian institutions needs improvement. 
1. The Department of Defense Culture Debate 
The U.S. frequently relies on its military to provide the preponderance of 
implementation personnel for stabilization and reconstruction operations.  Unfortunately, 
military success in post-conflict operations has been sporadic, at best.  Clearly, the 
military has unequalled expeditionary, equipment, and logistic capabilities.  However, the 
current culture and organization of resources may not support the most efficient results in 
post-conflict environments.  General Zinni’s “stuckee” theory rings true for post-conflict 
operations when he asserts that there are no other realistic opportunities to fill the gap 
between major combat operations and the creation of a stable environment that has been 







Figure 1.   The Gap in U.S. Capabilities 
 
The 1990s saw the first significant involvements in peacekeeping operations.  
Unfortunately, the effort could best be described as ad hoc, with the military serving as 
executive agent with little planning or coordination with other agencies.  Although the 
military was used because of its expeditionary capabilities, many agreed that civilians 
                                                 










were more appropriate for nation building activities, particularly when humanitarian 
agencies were involved.44  However, since the U.S. taxpayers fund the military’s 
expeditionary capabilities to the sum of approximately $400 billion per year, it may not 
be reasonable to expect the creation of a parallel capability in the civilian sector.  Indeed, 
post-conflict operations are frequently bounded by political decisions geared towards 
how best to return indigenous control of a region after the military has secured an area.  
Therefore, the goal of stabilization and reconstruction is how to combine three aspects: 
military capabilities, organization and culture; civilian oversight and direction; and 
external-internal civil-military cooperation.  It is clear that the optimal stability operation 
resolves these three conflicts by organizing the military more effectively and creating 
better integration between civilian and military capabilities.  National Security Advisor 
Condoleezza Rice summaries this quandary succinctly when she commented that “there’s 
nothing wrong with nation building, but not when it is done by the American military.”45  
An assessment of all DOD training resources is in order to ensure the best combination of 
increasing skill-sets for post-conflict operations and increasing civilian-military 
cooperation.   Increasing training and cooperation opportunities will allow a more 
efficient accomplishment of tasks along the post-conflict task continuum.  Increased 
compatability between civilian and military capabilities will allow planners to more 
easily identify the optimal mix of civilian and military functions.  For example, some 
post-conflict tasks, like security, may require a preponderance of military resources.  
Other tasks may be better suited for civilian resources, like the development of courts.  
The better the coordination between civilian and militry entities, the more easily planners 






                                                 
44 Nina M. Serafino and Martin A. Weiss, “Peacekeeping and Post-Conflict Capabilities: The State 
Department’s Office for Reconstruction and Stabilization,” CRS Report for Congress, Report RS22031, 19 
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Figure 2.   Increasing Joint Training Provides More Flexibility 
 
A reassessment of the military’s organization and resources would provide a 
foundation for improving results in post-conflict environments.  The military’s “tradition 
of forgetting”46 and its priorities must be changed for the new threats and taskings of the 
post-Cold War and post-9/11 environment.  The U.S. military must more fully appreciate 
the importance of integration with NGOs and humanitarian organizations.  Political and 
humanitarian considerations should replace military leadership as soon as possible, with 
the military in a supporting role.  The military can provide a bridge between active 
hostilities and the ability of the indigenous population to settle differences through a 
political and legal process.  While the military can provide resources, logistics, command 
and control and intelligence, it is “politics and politicians that must secure the changes 
and solutions to the causes of the conflict.”47  The U.S. military can begin making 
stabilization and reconstruction a higher priority by identifying resources and personnel 
most appropriate for post-conflict operations.  Indeed, small changes in currently-existing 
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2. The Role of the Military 
A substantive debate in the executive and legislative branches regarding the 
military’s role in stability operations frequently centers around three core issues.48  First, 
there are discussions regarding the suitability of military personnel for stabilization and 
reconstruction operations.  Many analysts and senior officers would argue that there are 
currently questions of suitability of military personnel because of training, doctrine and 
philosophy of military personnel who are still being trained primarily for major combat 
operations.  Many view this paradigm of training as oriented towards subduing and 
enemy in a non-permissive environment rather than cultivating the law enforcement and 
negotiating skills required in a post-conflict environment.  Thomas Donnelly succinctly 
captures this policy dilemma when he asserts that “the preferred American way of war is 
to dash about the planet, zapping its enemies from afar, and then prepare for the next 
sally.  It is, essentially, a raiding strategy on a global scale, the sort of approach more 
fitting for lesser powers than superpowers.”49  Unfortunately, this continually leaves a 
gap in U.S. capabilities to control events after the completion of major combat 
operations.  However, stabilization and reconstruction activities must begin before 
hostilities are completely finished.  This means that military personnel may be integral to 
assuring the delivery of humanitarian assistance.  Although some argue that a military 
presence confuses the objective/neutral status of civilian personnel, the need to ensure a 
secure and stable environment for these workers means that the military must address its 
effectiveness in stabilization missions and its integration with civilian capabilities and 
institutions.50 
The second core issue surrounding the debate of the military’s role in stabilization 
and reconstruction operations is a discussion of the impact of this mission area on 
readiness to conduct major combat operations.51  With the realization that military 
involvement in post-conflict operations was not going to diminish, many began to 
reframe the debate not in terms of suitability or adequacy of the military, but that the 
                                                 
48 The three core issues are discussed at length in Nina M. Serafino, “Peacekeeping and Related 
Stability Operations: Issues of U.S. Military Involvement,” CRS Issue Brief for Congress, Report IB94040, 
27 October 2005. 
49 Donnelly, 51. 
50 Serafino, 5-7. 
51 Ibid., 9. 
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current structure and size of the military did not allow for including the mission of 
stabilization and reconstruction along with the primary mission of major combat 
operations.  This shifted the debate from the military’s eschewment of non-traditional 
roles to an argument that the military was not structured to accomplish both roles 
simultaneously.  However, it is not clear that a complete review of all DOD resources has 
occurred to ensure all military capabilities are being brought to bear for this emerging 
mission area. 
The final major area of debate in the executive and legislative branches can be 
viewed in terms of a debate regarding deployment strains on equipment and personnel.  
While the previous issue was concerned with the structure of the military to meet its task 
environment, this issue deals with the cumulative strains of mission and structure on 
people and equipment.  It is inescapable that a military currently dual-tasked to perform 
substantive post-conflict operations and be prepared to conduct major combat operations 
will continue to face strains on equipment and personnel.  Specifically, stabilization and 
reconstruction taskings place additional strain on equipment and increase deployments 
for personnel in an all-volunteer force, making both less ready for major combat 
operations.52  Therefore, a significant debate is in order to determine roles and missions 
for the military.  It is clear that the military will be needed in post-conflict operations.  
The question is the military’s restructuring to better address this mission area.  Robert 
Kaplan succinctly summarizes the imperative to develop a more integrated system of 
civilian and military capabilities when he asserts that the U.S. military has emerged as the 
“world’s most effective emergency relief organization” because of its ability to deploy 
quickly, establish security and provide unequalled logistic support.53  To be fully 
effective, the military must assess whether it is organizing its resources to meet its 
doctrinal requirements in stability operations. 
The preceding discussion regarding the “roles and missions” debate and the need 
for greater civilian-military integration begs another  question: What is the strategy and 
policy guidance for the military to organize itself for post-conflict operations?  In 
addition, are there any similarities in taskings for post-conflict operations between the 
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Department of Defense and other government agencies?  The next major section analyzes 
possible areas of congruence in taskings for further consideration. 
C. THE MILITARY’S STRATEGIC GUIDANCE FOR POST-CONFLICT 
ENVIRONMENTS 
1. Introduction 
The debates over military structure, training and doctrine in addition to the need 
to integrate with other government agencies is intriguing because the disconnects would 
seem to stem not from a lack of strategic-level guidance or planning.  Specifically, there 
are multiple sources of doctrine and policy that direct increases in training and 
coordination that should provide sufficient authority to better integrate stabilization and 
reconstruction operations into the military and to increase civilian-military cooperation.  
This review cites four main examples that direct increases in integration and training for 
post-conflict operations: the Universal Joint Task List (UJTL); the creation of the State 
Department’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS); 
and the recent publishing of Department of Defense Directive 3000.05 (DODD 3000.05) 
and National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD-44).  The next task is to assess 
any similarities and determine any appropriate training or personnel resources that may 
be available within the Air Force. 
2. The Universal Joint Task List 
The first source of strategic guidance for stabilization operations is the UJTL.  
The UJTL is the authoritative strategic source for determining the tasks needed to 
accomplish the National Military Strategy.  Specifically, the UJTL “serve[s] as the 
foundation for capabilities-based planning across the range of military operations.”54  It is 
perhaps the most basic “to do” list for the U.S. military.  This guidance also establishes a 
relational hierarchy of mandates that link specific tasks with the National Military 
Strategy (NMS).  The UJTL describes the linkage between individual tasks and the NMS 
with the following definitions: 
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• Strategy: Over-arching military requirements to support National Security 
Strategy 
• End State: The set of required conditions that defines achievement of the 
commander's objectives. 
• Effect: A change to a condition, behavior, or degree of freedom. 
• Mission: The task and purpose of a military operation 
• Capabilities: ability to execute a specified course of action. 
• Task: Specific skills allowing military to provide a capability and fulfill 
taskings55 
Therefore, the UJTL mandates specific tasks in support of the National Military Strategy 















Figure 3.   Hierarchy of Mandates for the National Military Strategy 
 
Although many requirements described in the UJTL are applicable to stabilization and 
reconstruction operations, the five tasks below are particularly relevant: 
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• Cooperate with and support NGOs/PVOs 
• Provide government-wide support 
• Coordinate activities within the interagency process 
• Conduct civil-military operations 
• Foster interagency relations57 
3. Public Law 108-447 and the State Department’s Coordinator for 
Reconstruction and Stabilization 
Additionally, many aspects of the UJTL are paralleled by the Congressional intent 
of Public Law 108-447, which endorsed the creation of S/CRS.58  These two 
developments can provide synergies for improvements in stabilization and reconstruction 
operations.  This new ambassador-level agency is intended to answer a perceived lack of 
oversight over the transition from active hostilities to stable control by the local 
population.59  Specifically, there are four major task areas outlined in PL 108-447 that are 
designed to improve U.S. results in stabilization and reconstruction operations: 
• Determine and document resources outside the military 
• Develop non-military responses to post-conflict crises 
• Serve as the executive agent for U.S. response by coordinating U.S. response 
plans 
• Coordinate training of civilian personnel60 
4. Department of Defense Directive 3000.05 
A third strategic reference for post-conflict operations is found in Acting Deputy 
Secretary of Defense Gordon England publication of DODD 3000.05 in November 2005.  
This directive is designed to ensure that “stability operations are a core U.S. military 
mission…[that] shall be given priority comparable to combat operations.”61  Importantly, 
                                                 
57 The following tasks are taken from the Universal Joint Task List: (1) Strategic Theater Tasks (ST) 
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60 Serafino and Weiss, “Peacekeeping and Post-Conflict Capabilities: The State Department’s Office 
for Reconstruction and Stabilization,” 5. 
61 England, 2. 
27 
this policy provides clear guidance to increase training and integration in U.S. 
government agencies and aide organizations.  Some specific highlights include: 
• Coordinate DoD relations with the Department of State’s Office of the 
Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization 
• Identify DoD-wide stability operations capabilities 
• Develop a process to facilitate information sharing for stability operations among 
the DoD Components, and relevant U.S. Departments and Agencies…NGOs, and 
members of the Private Sector 
• Develop opportunities for personnel from other U.S. Departments and Agencies, 
foreign governments, International Organizations, and NGOs to participate, as 
appropriate, in DoD training related to stability operations62 
5. National Security Presidential Directive 44 
The final example of strategic guidance for stabilization operations impacting the 
Department of Defense is the publication of NSPD-44 on 7 December 2005.63  This 
directive identifies the Secretary of State (as delegated to the Coordinator for 
Reconstruction and Stabilization) as the executive agent for deliberate and crisis planning 
for stabilization and reconstruction operations and to ensure that the capabilities of 
individual agencies are combined effectively.  The document specifically directs that “the 
Secretaries of State and Defense will integrate stabilization and reconstruction 
contingency plans with military contingency plans…[and] will develop a general 
framework for fully coordinating stabilization and reconstruction activities and military 
operations at all levels.”64  Although there are numerous and wide-ranging 
responsibilities assigned to the Department of State, they can be collapsed into five 
general areas of responsibility: 
• Develop detailed contingency plans for integrated United States Government 
reconstruction and stabilization efforts 
                                                 
62 England, para. 5.1.2, 5.1.4, 5.1.9,and 5.3.5. 
63 George Bush, National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD-44, 7 December 2005.  Available 
through the website of The Partnership for Effective Peacekeeping at 
www.effectivepeacekeeping.org/docs/usgov/Directive%20NSPD44.pdf.  Accessed 1 March 2006. 
64 Ibid., 5. 
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• Coordinate United States Government responses for reconstruction and 
stabilization with the Secretary of Defense 
• Coordinate reconstruction and stabilization activities…[with] international and 
regional organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and private sector entities 
• Lead United States Government development of a strong civilian response 
capability including necessary surge capabilities 
• Identify lessons learned and integrate them into operations65 
It is clear that the “fog of peace” present in post-conflict operations create 
opportunities for confusion and duplication of effort.66  Most seriously, ineffective 
stability operations policy leads to unnecessary risks for personnel and a waste of scarce 
resources for the U.S. taxpayer.  Fortunately, there appears to be a high level of 
congruence in policy directives and congressional intent summarized in the preceding 
review.  The next task is to evaluate any pre-existing training resources that can be used 
to satisfy the concerns of the post-conflict literature and the policy directives for U.S. 
agencies tasked with stabilization operations.  The next major area of this research 
assesses one possibility. 
D. THE AIR FORCE ON-SCENE COMMANDERS COURSE 
 Multiple after-action reports and analyses have asserted that stabilization and 
reconstruction requires a different skill-set than major combat operations.67  The Air 
Force’s On-Scene Commanders Course addresses this need.  Expanding attendance 
within DOD and including non-DOD personnel will increase the pool of personnel with 
skill-sets for stability operations and would increase understanding between civilian and 
military personnel.   
Four works are particularly representative of the discussions regarding the 
importance of education and training for success in stabilization operations.  In 
“Educating International Security Practitioners,” Smith et al provide a thorough review of 
the nexus of military education and the requirements twenty-first century security 
                                                 
65 Bush, “Responsibilities of the Department of State,” para. 3, 5, 6, 9, and 10. 
66 Manfred K. Rotermund, The Fog of Peace: Finding the End-State of Hostilities (Carlisle: Strategic 
Studies Institute, November 1999), 47-52. 
67 See especially: Blank, Carafano and Dillon, Donahoe, Flavin, Rotermund, Smith and Kaufman et al, 
Watson, Wong , Wong and Gerras et al. 
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environment.68  Their review finds that major changes are necessary to ensure U.S. forces 
have the capability to make transitions from war to peace.  Perhaps more powerfully, 
Wong et al asserts in “Strategic Leadership Competencies” that an integrated leadership 
development program should be developed to address the requirements of post-conflict 
operations.69  In addition, Wong’s adaptive leader concept argues that stabilization and 
reconstruction duties may be making better officers, albeit not in their traditional 
specialties.70  The Fifteenth Annual Strategy Conference hosted by the U.S. Army’s 
Strategic Studies Institute asserts that an overwhelming gap exists between analysis and 
prescriptions for success and operational results.  Matthews’ summary provides a 
convincing argument for increasing training and education opportunities for personnel 
engaged in stabilization and reconstruction operations and that new leadership 
capabilities must be created to address stability operations.71  Finally, Flavin describes 
the critical importance of successful civilian-military operations in his review of the first 
year of Operation Enduring Freedom.  Specifically, he describes the importance of 
civilian-military cooperation to facilitate the transition between military security-focused 
operations and civilian nation-building and stability operations.72 
1. Specific Course Elements 
 The On-Scene Commanders Course covers the topics (and others) listed in Figure 
4 via a four-day training workshop involving seminar presentations, hands-on exercises 






                                                 
68 James M. Smith, Daniel J. Kaufman, et al, “Educating International Security Practitioners: 
Preparing to Face the Demands of the 21st Century International Security Environment,” United States 
Army Strategic Studies Institute, July 2001. 
69 Leonard Wong and Stephen Gerras, et al, “Strategic Leadership Competencies,” United States 
Army Strategic Studies Institute, September 2003. 
70 Leonard Wong, Developing Adaptive Leaders: The Crucible Experience of Operation Iraqi 
Freedom (Carlisle, PA: United States Army Strategic Studies Institute, July 2004), 7. 
71 Matthews, 1-3. 















Figure 4.   Major Topics of the On-Scene Commanders Course 
 
The course was created in 1980 during the aftermath of a Titan II Intercontinental 
Ballistic Missile accident in Damascus, Arkansas.  The intent of the course was to create 
a better crisis management response and leadership capability and to teach leaders how to 
integrate various response agencies and seeks to address the following goals: 
• Provide emergency/contingency response training. 
• Emphasize peacetime techniques and WMD response. 
• Teach command and control functions during emergency/contingency situations. 
• Teach situation assessment, communications, planning, public affairs and 
logistics support.73 
The On-Scene Commanders Course currently trains approximately 400 people per 
year through a combination of in-residence instruction at Maxwell Air Force Base, 
Alabama and various traveling teams that provide instruction to sponsoring organizations 
within the Air Force.  The Air Force is the only DOD agency that provides a separate 
                                                 
73 On-Scene Commanders Course Website, Ira C. Eaker College for Professional Development, 
Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama.  Available at 




•Major accident / disaster response policies
•Legal / media orientation
•Medical responses
•Hazardous materials accident responses
•Mishap investigation and reporting
•Terrorism
•Explosive ordinance identification and disposal
•Post traumatic stress debriefing
•Office of Special Investigation
•Contingency contracting
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academic experience that teaches crisis management and integrated response skills.74  
The training includes how to respond to contingency and crisis situations by integrating 
and managing various responding agencies, including civilian resources, as appropriate.  
It is clear that a dialogue must begin to determine how to expand this course to more 
personnel, particularly those involved in stabilization and reconstruction operations. 
2. Major Benefits 
 The On-Scene Commanders Course can provide a valuable contribution to post-
conflict operations for several reasons.  In addition to following Donahoe’s assertion that 
leaders are needed that can quickly transition from combat to stability operations,75 there 
are numerous reasons why expanding this Air Force resource makes sense for the 
stabilization and reconstruction community.  First, the On-Scene Commanders Course 
would help answer the problem of multiple authorities, cultures and priorities by 
providing a standardized experience for post-conflict personnel.  Using a common 
framework as provided for in this class would allow responding agencies to establish 
better understandings of capabilities, authorities, and command-and-control issues.  An 
integrated approach like the On-Scene Commanders Course would provide increased 
flexibility and response capability from the wide range of U.S. agencies involved in post-
conflict operations.  The opportunity to learn common practices and integration 
procedures would be increased by the course and provide a chance to exchange ideas in a 
week-long seminar.  Indeed, this Air Force resource may go a long way to answering the 
taskings of DODD 3000.05 as well as Binnendijk and Johnson’s call for civilian agencies 
to create new programs to better integrate their capabilities and appreciate the “maze of 
competing and conflicting entities.”76  The course could also provide a valuable training 
baseline for deployable civilian teams, perhaps as a capstone course prior to deployment. 
 A second benefit of the On-Scene Commanders Course would allow the civilian 
community to leverage the best practices of the Air Force.  It would support a Council on 
Foreign Relations-sponsored assessment suggesting the creation of additional civilian-
military training to increase cooperation.  Using this pre-existing training would also 
                                                 
74 Niel Krosner, Course Director, United States Air Force On-Scene Commanders Course, Interview 
by William D. Fischer, Telephone and e-mail, 5 October 2005. 
75 Donahoe, 26. 
76 Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations, 105-106. 
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allow entities such as the Department of State to solidify its role as executive agent 
without expending unnecessary funds to create training programs from scratch.77  In 
addition, an expanded audience for the On-Scene Commanders Course finds agreement 
with the Defense Science Board’s 2004 Summer Study, “Transition to and from 
Hostilities,” which stated that increased inter-agency cooperation is needed between the 
Departments of Defense and State.78  It is clear this Air Force resource would allow the 
military to increase training for, and appreciation of, stabilization and reconstruction 
tasks while helping create similar synergies in the civilian sector and making this skill-set 
a core competency for the Department of State. 
 A third benefit of expanding attendance would involve an appreciation for what 
Karl Rohr has termed progressive reconstruction.  The On-Scene Commanders Course 
could be used to increase capabilities in the crisis management and integrative skills 
needed in post-conflict operations.  By combining military and civilian attendees from 
the entire spectrum of supporting agencies, the course could increase the understanding 
for an increasingly blurry line between combat and stability operations and that the most 
effective stabilization operation does not occur after active hostilities have ceased, but are 
conducted concurrently and immediately as objectives are secured.79 
 Perhaps most importantly, a fourth major benefit to increasing the use of the On-
Scene Commanders Course would involve a direct support of the initiative to create a 
pool of deployable civilian teams that are well-versed in crisis-management and 
integration of multiple response agencies.  It would also substantively contribute to the 
creation of a “U.S. training center for complex contingency operations.”80  Civilian 
attendance at the On-Scene Commanders Course could create deployable expertise that 
can easily integrate with other agencies within Rohr’s progressive reconstruction 
concept.  Course materials provided by the Air Force could assist in the creation of a 
national training center for stabilization and reconstruction. 
                                                  
77 “In the Wake of War: Improving U.S. Post-Conflict Capabilities,” ed. William Nash, Report of an 
Independent Task Force, Council on Foreign Relations, 2005, 11 and xiii. 
78 Transition to and from Hostilities, vi. 
79 Rohr, 48.  See also Watson, 9-10. 
80 John J. Hamre, “Civilian Post-Conflict Reconstruction Capabilities,” Testimony Before the U.S. 









































•Provide emergency/contingency response training
•Emphasize peacetime techniques and WMD response
•Teach command/control functions during
emergency/contingency situations
•Teach situation assessment, communications, planning,
public affairs and logistics support
On-Scene Commanders Course
•Cooperate with and support
NGOs/PVOs
•Provide government-wide support




Universal Joint Task List
•Determine and document resources
available outside the military
•Develop non-military responses to
post-conflict crises
•Act as executive agent for U.S.
response
•Coordinate training of civilians
State Department: S/CRS
•Coordinate DOD relations with S/CRS
•Identify DoD-wide stability operations
capabilities
•Develop a process to facilitate
information sharing within the DoD
and other agencies, NGOs, and the
Private Sector
•Develop opportunities for personnel
from U.S. and foreign governments,
NGOs, and IOs to participate, as
appropriate, in DOD training related
to stability operations 
DOD Directive 3000.05
•Develop contingency plans for
integrated reconstruction and
stabilization efforts
•Coordinate responses with DOD
•Coordinate with international and
regional organizations, NGOs, and
the private sector
•Lead development of a civilian
response capability
•Identify lessons learned and integrate
them into operations 
NSPD-44
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The Air Force On-Scene Commanders Course can simultaneously satisfy the 
requirements of the UJTL, Congressional intent as operationalized in PL 108-447 and the 
creation of S/CRS, and the recent publication of DODD 3000.05 and NSPD-44. 
3. A Spectrum of Assistance for Training 
There are gaps in civilian-military cooperation and the military’s structure for 
stability operations.  Although strategic-level guidance exists for civilian and military 
personnel involved in post-conflict environments, not all resources are being considered.  
Understanding the deliverables is not the problem, it is the ability to leverage already-
existing assets to maximize efficiency and results.  The Air Force’s On-Scene 
Commanders Course could provide answers to many of these issues.  Modifying the Air 
Force’s course and creating a spectrum of assistance can provide the U.S. with the 
training and flexibility needed to succeed in this growing mission area.  The following 
are options to consider for using the On-Scene Commanders Course to increase U.S. 
capabilities in post-conflict operations: 
• Increase capacity at Air University for additional in-residence attendees 
• Increase use of mobile training teams to deliver course material to wider 
audiences 
• Create a distance learning experience managed by Air University, already an 
expert at delivering education via correspondence 
• Make course materials available to other agencies to modify as they see fit 
The On-Scene Commanders Course teaches crisis management and interagency 
cooperation that can be valuable to anyone involved with post-conflict duties.  In the final 
analysis, this pre-existing and underutilized resource provides three key benefits.  First, 
the course content answers many of the issues and shortfalls raised by the stabilization 
and reconstruction literature. Second, the course answers the mandates outlined by the 
UJTL, supports Congressional intent as outlined in documents such as PL 108-447 and 
the creation of the S/CRS function in the Department of State, and matches the intent of 
DODD 3000.05 and NSPD-44.  Finally, this course would provide an opportunity to 
expand civilian-military cooperation and understanding in a critical mission area.  In this 
case, the U.S. may already have the tools its needs to solve a compelling and enduring 
problem.  It is time to discuss expanding the parameters of the Air Force’s On-Scene 
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Commanders Course.  With a potential training source identified to increase U.S. 
capabilities in post-conflict operations, the next task is to determine if any personnel 
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IV. PERSONNEL RESOURCES FOR POST-CONFLICT 
ENVIRONMENTS 
“Because post-conflict…operations are likely of long duration and will vary in 
intensity, planners must account for the capabilities required to achieve campaign 
objectives.” 
 
      -- US National Military Strategy81 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This paper began with identifying the three major themes of improving U.S. 
success in post-conflict environments.  It continued with an analysis of a potential 
training resource within the Air Force that could answer many of the literature concerns.  
This training example also appears to satisfy many congressional and State Department 
concerns for increasing efficiency in stabilization operations.  Most importantly, this 
training example matches several of the mandates found in the recently released 
Department of Defense Directive 3000.05.  This paper now looks at personnel resources 
within the Air Force to determine any potential resources for post-conflict operations. 
This chapter continues the work of previous chapters in three major areas.  To 
begin with, an overview of major problems in recent stability operations is in order.  
Determining the major problems may assist in identifying the proper personnel to 
increase mission accomplishment.  The second major area looks at how Air Force 
resources are organized at the wing-level to determine the likely location for resources 
that may be able to contribute to post-conflict operations.  Specifically, this research 
assesses how major capabilities are organized at the wing-level by reviewing 
organizational structures and mission statements.  The final area will review senior 
officers within the Air Force wing-level structure to assess similarities between roles and 
responsibilities and the trends identified in the previous chapters.  In particular, Air Force 
Mission Support Group Commanders are seen as a possible resource of critical skills for 
stabilization operations.  Specifically, this chapter will conclude with a review of Mission 
                                                 
81 “The National Military Strategy of the United States of America: A Strategy for Today; A Vision 
for Tomorrow,” United States Department of Defense, January 2004, 21. 
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Support Group Commander availability, qualifications, and training by reviewing 
primary source data from the Military Personnel Data System (MILPDS). 
B. MAJOR CONCERNS IN POST-CONFLICT ENVIRONMENTS 
While U.S. success in traditional, force-on-force battles is widely acknowledged, 
similar results in stabilization and reconstruction have been far less consistent.  This 
section begins with an adaptation of David Galula’s counterinsurgency model to assist in 
understanding the disconnects with success in combat operations and the stability 
environment.  It continues with a brief review of the major concerns in post-conflict 
operations such as Afghanistan and Iraq. 
Although Galula’s work is concerned with the factors affecting counterinsurgency 
warfare, the models aid understanding the disconnect between success in traditional 
combat operations and effectiveness in post-conflict operations.82  Galula offers two 
explanations why there is little confusion over major combat operations but there 
continues to be a lack of consensus during stability operations.  The first element is the 
existence of a clear goal and defined tasks.  Specifically, the target for the U.S. is the 
defeat of the opposing military and occupation of its former area of control.  Galula 
asserts that this lends itself to clear lines of authority and execution, with the political 
goals set by the government and the execution of the policy clearly within the military 
span of control.  However, Galula is correct that post-conflict environments do not have 
such clear objectives, consensus and delineated tasks.  His work provides a succinct 
summation of the difficulties of post-conflict operations when he observes that “transition 
from peace to war is very gradual, the issue is never clear…military and political actions 
cannot be separated.”83  With Galula’s framework as a guide, the next task is to review 
the major trends preventing a more complete success for the U.S. in stability operations. 
U.S. difficulties in post-conflict operations are a constant subject in popular 
media, government reports, and research institutes.  The common themes of security and 
infrastructure repair emerge as frequent shortfalls from the post-conflict analyses.  For 
example, the Government Accountability Office found that Security was one of the major 
barriers to effective reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan and that long-term 
                                                 
82 David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (New York: Praeger, 1964). 
83 Ibid., 84. 
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infrastructure projects were hampered by limited strategic guidance and funding.84  The 
review specifically noted that “deteriorating security…in particular jeopardized U.S. 
reconstruction efforts, and efforts to counter these obstacles have had little success.”85 In 
addition, the report asserted that “the criminality of the warlords’ private armies continued to 
destabilize the country and impede reconstruction.”86  A review of the variables assessed in 
the Brookings Institution’s Afghanistan Index and Iraq Index also provide a sobering 
account of the prevalence of security and infrastructure concerns in these two operations.  
For example, the Afghanistan Index tracks thirty-one security and infrastructure variables 
and only seven indicators of political opinion and stability.87  A more sobering view of 
the pervasive impact of security and infrastructure concerns is the Iraq Index tracking of 
forty-three security indicators and 26 infrastructure variables, but only sixteen indicators 
of political opinion and stability.88  Andrew Krepinevich’s assessment of the Iraq war 
focuses almost exclusively on how to increase security.  His concept of the oil spot 
provides a convincing linkage of security and infrastructure concerns in a post-conflict 
environment.  In summary, this concept asserts that, rather than trying to be everywhere 
at once, stabilization forces should focus on securing an initially limited area (the oil 
spot) and expand that area as security and infrastructure is stabilized.  This “enduring 
level of security…will facilitate reconstruction.”89  Finally, a recent Government 
Accounting Office (GAO) report highlighted a significant link between security problems 
and deficiencies in reconstructing infrastructure, stating that “poor security conditions 
                                                 
84 David Gootnick et al, Afghanistan Reconstruction: Deteriorating Security and Limited Resources 
Have Impeded Progress; Improvements in U.S. Strategy Needed, United States General Accounting Office 
Report 04-403, June 2004.  See also reports such as Kenneth Katzman, Afghanistan: Post-War 
Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, Congressional Research Service Report RL30588 (Washington, 
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85 Ibid., 39. 
86 Ibid., 42. 
87 Michael E. O’Hanlon and Adriana Lins de Albuquerque, Afghanistan Index: Tracking Variables of 
Reconstruction & Security in Post-Taliban Afghanistan (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 19 May 
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88 Michael E. O’Hanlon and Nina Kamp, Iraq Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction & Security 
in Post-Saddam Iraq (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 9 January 2006).  The author accounted for 
the variables of “Trained Judges” and “Felony Cases Resolved in Iraqi Courts” in the Political category 
rather than the Infrastructure category, as it was listed in the report. 
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have slowed reconstruction and increased costs.”90  The report also asserts that 
“contractor officials acknowledged that security costs have diverted a considerable 
amount of reconstruction resources and have led to canceling or reducing the scope of 
some reconstruction projects.”91 
With the acknowledgement that security and infrastructure are two of the primary 
concerns in post-conflict operations, the next task is to review applicable Air Force 
organizations and leadership for potential use in addressing these concerns. 
C. THE AIR FORCE MISSION SUPPORT GROUP 
This research now endeavors to review Air Force organizational assets to 
determine if there are any parallels with the issues of infrastructure and security identified 
in the previous review.  Specifically, this section will review how the Air Force organizes 
its personnel and major functions at the wing-level.  A review of the Air Force basic 
organizational doctrine and organizational charts will determine how the major functions 
are organized.  This research will then attempt to identify any major skill-sets within 
those organizational constructs for post-conflict operations. 
This research has identified security and infrastructure as major areas of concern 
for post-conflict operations.  The current task is to determine how the Air Force 
organizational structure addresses similar concerns to determine any useful arrangements 
for post-conflict operations.  Air Force Doctrine Document 2-4.4 (AFDD 2-4.4) outlines 
the Air Force’s concepts for infrastructure, facilities, and combat support.92  Specifically, 
this document outlines guiding principles for commanders to “provide for the right mix 
of resources and capabilities at the right time and right place to support operational or 
strategic objectives.”93  In this vein, AFDD 2-4.4 describes the critical roles and 
functions of Air Force infrastructure and support.  There are nine functions that have 
particular applicability to the infrastructure and security concerns previously identified in 
post-conflict environments:94 
                                                 
90 Joseph A. Christoff, “Rebuilding Iraq: Stabilization, Reconstruction, and Financing Challenges,” 
Testimony before the United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Report GAO-06-428T, 8 
February 2006, 9. 
91 Ibid., 8. 
92 “Bases, Infrastructure, and Facilities,” Air Force Doctrine Document 2-4.4, 13 November 1999. 
93 Ibid., 47. 
94 Ibid., 2-3. The nine functions are adapted from Table 1, “Functions and Roles.” 
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Civil Engineer: Provides general and combat engineering; 
explosive ordinance disposal; disaster preparedness; environmental 
management; major accident recovery; fore protection; and 
mitigation and recovery from the effects of weapons of mass 
destruction (including nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons), 
peacetime emergencies, and terrorist incidents. 
Communications and Information: Provides the capabilities to 
create, store, retrieve, fuse, display, disseminate, and dispose of 
information.  This capability includes communications, 
information resources management, information warfare support, 
knowledge management through records management, postal 
support, visual information, and computer support. 
Contracting: Provides the means for basic life support, including 
billeting, food, water, and transportation.  Negotiates leasing and 
renting contracts, provides local services, and assists in rebuilding 
infrastructure, bridges, and roads. 
Logistics Plans: Responsible for integrating logistics functions as 
well as base support, deployment, reception, resupply, and 
redeployment planning. 
Personnel: Provides airmen with the proper skills, training, and 
experience required to accomplish the mission.  Builds and 
sustains accession, development, and workforce management plans 
and programs needed to allow all functions to meet their missions 
with effective human resources.  Provides accountability of in-
garrison and deployed forces.  Provides commanders reachback 
capabilities to increase or decrease available personnel. 
Security Forces: Provides forces for air base defense, security, and 
law enforcement services.  Provides protection to weapons 
systems, personnel, and infrastructure. 
Services: Provides food service, mortuary affairs, lodging, fitness, 
retail sales and services, laundry and dry cleaning services, and 
recreational opportunities while maintaining a sense of community 
and quality of life. 
Supply: Stocks, stores, and issues assets that support operations 
and the repair of assets. 
Transportation: Provides timely delivery, resupply, retrograde, and 
vehicle support. 
 
With these basic security and infrastructure capabilities identified, the next task is 
to determine how these functions are organized within the Air Force.  Determining the 
organizational location for these functions may help identify key leaders responsible for 
managing these functions and, potentially, provide insights into how the Air Force 
manages these functions. 
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Air Force Instruction 38-101 prescribes standard organizational structures for the 
Air Force.95  This document provides the most detail for the Standard Wing organization, 
which is the primary means by which the Air Force “generates and employs combat 
capability.”96  A more complete discussion of the organization of Air Force capabilities 
at the wing-level can be found in Program Action Directive 02-05 (PAD 02-05).  This 
plan outlines the Combat Wing Organization Structure and describes how the Air Force 
capabilities that have applications for post-conflict operations (described from AFDD 2-


















Figure 6.   Typical Air Force Combat Wing Structure 
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Therefore, since the Air Force has organized its security and infrastructure 
capabilities in the Mission Support Group, there may be leadership assets in this 
organization that can contribute to stabilization operations and add to the potential 
contributions already identified from the On-Scene Commanders Course. 
D. MISSION SUPPORT GROUP COMMANDERS 
Since the previous section identified parallels between the infrastructure and 
security concerns of post-conflict environments and the Air Force’s Mission Support 
Groups, a review of the senior officers that command these organizations is in order.  
Specifically, this section involves an analysis of primary source data from MILPDS that 
outlines critical concerns if this resource is to be considered for a new mission area.  To 
begin with, this research will determine how many current and graduated Mission 
Support Group Commanders are in the Air Force inventory.  This will provide a general 
idea of how many officers would potentially be available to provide expertise in this area.  
The next area will review how many years the average officer has been engaged in 
Mission Support Group issues.  In particular, the years spent assigned to Mission Support 
Group-related positions are reviewed to determine the level of experience officers have in 
these issues.  A third area of consideration is assignment to joint-service positions.  This 
can be seen as a key indicator of experience in an environment that requires the 
integration of multiple organizational constructs and may provide an indicator of 
experience with multiple constituencies and organizational priorities and cultures.  A 
fourth area assessed is the officers’ time left in service after completing a tour of duty as 
a Mission Support Group Commander.  Since the Air Force limits the number of years 
officers can serve, and the position of Mission Support Group Commander is a senior 
command position, it will be necessary to determine if there is sufficient time left in these 
officers’ careers to leverage their experience as Mission Support Group Commanders.  
The fifth area of consideration is the advanced education of these officers to determine 
any opportunities to leverage their education as well as experience.  This final area will 
attempt to collapse graduate education into broad categories to determine any 




1. Numbers and Locations 
 A query of MILPDS was conducted to determine the number of senior officers 
with experience commanding Mission Support Groups.  Officers commanding a Mission 
Support Group are assigned an Air Force Specialty Code (AFSC) of 30C0.  This research 
utilized the AFSC of 30C0 to determine how many officers in the current Air Force 
inventory possess this experience.  The results are based on a query of MILPDS with data 
current as of 4 January 2006.98  The query results were collapsed into individual 
experience reports in the Single Uniform Retrieval Format, commonly referred to as 
SURFs.  These products give a one-page career summary on an individual, highlighting 
key career aspects for analysis. 
 The analysis of the system query revealed 76 officers currently commanding the 
Mission Support Groups that support the Air Force’s 105 major active wings.99  Perhaps 
more importantly, the data reveal the existence of 165 officers that have completed their 
command tours and have remained in the Air Force inventory.  These results suggest the 
existence of a significant senior leadership resource that is experienced in managing 
security and infrastructure issues that may prove valuable in stabilization and 
reconstruction environments.  The next task is to determine the level of experience these 
officers possess with Mission Support Group issues.  The following two sections seek to 
answer relevant questions regarding experience. 
2. Mission Support Group Experience 
 This research now concerns itself with the question of experience in Mission 
Support Group issues that have already been found to have significant parallels in the 
stabilization and reconstruction literature and the Air Force’s Combat Wing 
organizational structure.  Specifically, this research assesses how many years officers 
were typically assigned to Mission Support Group-related duties and the amount of 
command experience at the squadron-level as exhibited by the organizations listed under 
the Mission Support Group in Figure 6.   
                                                 
98 This analysis of Mission Support Group Commanders was made possible by the Headquarters Air 
Mobility Command Directorate of Personnel Systems Analysis Branch, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois.  All 
data are based on a SURF query with data from 4 January 2006. 
99 Listing of major active wings taken from a listing provided by the office of the Air Force Deputy 
Chief of Staff for Personnel, Washington, D.C., 23 March 2005.  The difference in numbers exists because 
a Mission Support Group can act as part of a “host” wing, supporting other wings at the same installation 
that are frequently referred to as “tenants.” 
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 The research reveals that the 76 current commanders have an average of 13.7 
years of assignments in Mission Support Group-related duties.  In addition, 56 
commanders have previously served as subordinate commanders of organizations 
outlined in Figure 6, with 21 officers commanding a Mission Support Group organization 
on more than one occasion.  Although the research found that 20 current commanders 
were in their first Mission Support Group-related command as the group commander, this 
set typically found their prior command experience in other Air Force organizations.  In 
addition, 40 of the 76 current commanders have been promoted to their current or 
previous ranks early.  While being selected for military command is a clear indicator of 
ability and success by itself, the data indicating the prevalence if below the promotion 
zone officers provides another indication of the quality of these officers.  In sum, these 
numbers suggest a highly experienced group that may be capable of applying their 
current skill-set from their Mission Support Groups to stabilization and reconstruction 
environments. 
3. Joint Service Experience 
 Experience in a joint service and multi-agency environment has clear value to 
post-conflict environments and is a skill-set receiving great attention in the stabilization 
and reconstruction literature reviewed earlier.  The research into Mission Support Group 
Commanders also provided encouraging results into this area of experience.  The 76 
current commanders contain 44 officers that have been assigned to joint and multi-agency 
duty.  These officers have an average of 2.8 years in these positions.  In addition, 16 of 
the officers have been assigned to more than one joint duty position.  This research 
appears to support that Mission Support Group Commanders have extensive command 
experience in key aspects of post-conflict operations and have a great deal of experience 
in integrating different organizations as represented in the extent of experience in joint 
service and multi-agency assignments. 
4. Time Available After Command Tour 
 The results to this point seem to indicate the existence of a highly experienced 
pool of Air Force officers that have skills applicable to stabilization and reconstruction 
operations.  However, a complete analysis is not possible without reviewing the 
availability of these officers.  Therefore, the next task of this research will be to assess 
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how much time these officers would be available to leverage their experience from their 
command tours in the Mission Support Group.   
 The current pool of commanders has been in commissioned service for an average 
of 23.91 years.  Since Air Force colonels are normally limited to 30 years of service,100 
this leaves an average of 5.84 years to leverage this significant experience after 
completion of the Mission Support Group command tour.101  Therefore, this pool of 
commanders is experienced in a great deal of stabilization and reconstruction issues and 
also have time available left in their Air Force careers to leverage that experience with 
assignments after their command tour ends. 
5. Advanced Education Trends 
 A final area of analysis involves the assessment of advanced academic degrees.  
While it is not surprising that 100% of the current commanders have advanced academic 
degrees, it is worth noting that 57 of the 76 have two or more advanced degrees.  This 
suggests a highly motivated and educated cadre of officers.  The graduate education of 
these officers can be collapsed into four major areas: 
• National Security Policy    48% 
• Public Policy / Political Science / Liberal Arts 20% 
• Civil Engineering / Technical Degrees  17% 
• Business      15% 
This high level of graduate education, combined with the factors previously discussed, 
begins to build a picture of a highly capable group of officers with highly relevant skills 
that have, most importantly, time remaining in their Air Force careers to potentially 
provide assistance to improving U.S. capabilities in stabilization and reconstruction 
operations. 
6. A Resource for Post-Conflict Environments? 
 The previous discussion of Mission Support Group Commanders provides an 
intriguing possibility for increasing U.S. success in stabilization and reconstruction 
operations for five reasons as outlined in Figure 7: 
                                                 
100 “Service Retirements,” Air Force Instruction 36-3203, 12 September 2003, Table 4.1, Rule 5. 
101 The discrepancy between averages for years of commissioned service and years left until the 30-


























Figure 7.   Summary of Mission Support Group Commanders 
 
The previous discussions regarding the stabilization and reconstruction literature, the On-
Scene Commanders Course, and Air Force Mission Support Group Commanders allows a 
modification of the model from Figure 5 to include a more complete paradigm.  In 
particular, it is important to note that Mission Support Commanders attend the On-Scene 
Commanders Course as a requirement of assuming their positions.102  Therefore, Mission 
Support Group Commanders represent a unique synthesis of the skills and requirements 







                                                 
102 On-Scene Commanders Course Website.  See also Niel Krosner. 
Mission Support Group Commanders:
An Untapped Resource?
•Already-existing leadership resource
•76 current and 165 previous commanders
•Experienced in security and infrastructure issues
•13.7 years in related duties
•74% have related previous command experience
•28% have multiple related previous command tours
•Motivated and recognized potential
•53% are below-the-zone
•100% have advanced degrees
•75% have two or more advanced degrees
•Joint and multi-agency experience
•58% have joint duty experience
•21% have more than one joint assignment
•Availability








































Figure 8.   An Air Force Model of Post-Conflict Resources 
 
 
The revised model clearly shows the interaction of doctrine and policy with two critical 
Air Force resources that could improve U.S. results in post-conflict operations.  The final 
















•Provide emergency/contingency response training
•Emphasize peacetime techniques and WMD response
•Teach command/control functions during
emergency/contingency situations
•Teach situation assessment, communications, planning,
public affairs and logistics support
On-Scene Commanders Course
•Cooperate with and support
NGOs/PVOs
•Provide government-wide support




Universal Joint Task List
•Determine and document resources
available outside the military
•Develop non-military responses to
post-conflict crises
•Act as executive agent for U.S.
response
•Coordinate training of civilians
State Department: S/CRS
•Coordinate DOD relations with S/CRS
•Identify DoD-wide stability operations
capabilities
•Develop a process to facilitate
information sharing within the DoD
and other agencies, NGOs, and the
Private Sector
•Develop opportunities for personnel
from U.S. and foreign governments,
NGOs, and IOs to participate, as
appropriate, in DOD training related
to stability operations 
DOD Directive 3000.05
•Develop contingency plans for
integrated reconstruction and
stabilization efforts
•Coordinate responses with DOD
•Coordinate with international and
regional organizations, NGOs, and
the private sector
•Lead development of a civilian
response capability
•Identify lessons learned and integrate
them into operations 
NSPD-44
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potential assets for stabilization operations.  This research has provided two strong 
possibilities that, with modifications, could create a spectrum of assistance for the Air 
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V. LEVERAGING EXISTING ASSETS FOR STABILIZATION 
AND RECONSTRUCTION 
This research has reviewed the key issues regarding the training and personnel 
issues surrounding a growing mission area for the U.S. Department of Defense.  
Specifically, this research analyzed common themes in the post-conflict stabilization 
literature and assessed U.S. Air Force training and personnel resources that may increase 
opportunities for success.  The review found that the Air Force has the potential to 
positively affect stabilization operations by leveraging already-existing training courses 
and utilizing personnel that perform many tasks that have parallels in the stabilization 
literature and after-action reports from post-conflict operations.  This research asserts that 
a spectrum of assistance could be created with minimal changes to the On-Scene 
Commanders Course.  In addition, Air Force Mission Support Group Commanders were 
found to have significant parallels between their developed skill-sets and responsibilities 
and the issues raised in the stabilization literature.  This work also asserted that an 
increased dialogue is needed to fully-develop the ideas presented in this review.  
Although the Air Force is not the lead agent for post-conflict operations, it is clear that 
there are training resources and personnel that may be underutilized and available for a 
wider mission.  Only this increased discussion will enable the U.S. to conduct a complete 
review of how it organizes its training and resources for post-conflict operations.  
Anything less than a full analysis represents an inefficient use of resources and 
unnecessary risks to personnel. 
A.  SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
This analysis was intended to determine if the Air Force could offer additional 
support to the U.S. effort in stability operations.  The research was designed to assess any 
parallels between Air Force training and personnel resources and the doctrine and 
taskings for post-conflict operations.  This review was conducted in three stages.  To 
begin with, a review of the post-conflict literature was conducted to determine general 
themes regarding improving U.S. capabilities in stabilization operations.  Specifically, the 
literature review revealed three broad areas of concern regarding the U.S. organization of 
resources for post-conflict operations.  The first trend addressed the integration of civilian 
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and military people, resources, and procedures.  These discussions asserted that 
significant improvements in stability operations can be found in determining how to 
better integrate civilian and military resources.  A second major theme framing the 
debates about improving U.S. efficiency in post-conflict environments involved 
increasing training and education for people involved in stability operations.  This review 
revealed that, although there are extensive calls in the literature for increased training, 
there is less consensus regarding the methods to be employed.  The final major area of 
the post-conflict literature review involved how the military is structured internally.  
Specifically, these debates involved assessments of currently-existing Department of 
Defense assets.  Much of this discussion involved how current military units and 
resources can be realigned for stability operations. 
This review’s second major area of inquiry assessed Air Force training resources 
to determine the existence of any parallels with the concerns reached in the post-conflict 
literature and strategic guidance from the U.S. government.  The Air Force On-Scene 
Commanders Course was found to answer many of the issues from the literature review 
and doctrinal guidance.  This research reviewed four significant doctrinal promulgations 
that largely shape the strategic guidance for post-conflict operations: 1) The Universal 
Joint Task List; 2) Creation of the State Department’s Coordinator for Reconstruction and 
Stabilization; 3) Department of Defense Directive 3000.05; 4) National Security 
Presidential Directive 44.  After a review of these significant guiding documents, the Air 
Force On-Scene Commanders Course was found to simultaneously answer many of the 
concerns of the post-conflict literature as well as the current strategic guidance for 
stability operations.  Specifically, this paper found the following key areas from the On-
Scene Commanders Course also addressed in the post-conflict literature and strategic 
guidance for post-conflict operations:  1) Provide emergency/contingency response 
training; 2) Emphasize peacetime techniques and WMD response; 3) Teach command 
and control functions during emergency and contingency situations; 4) Teach situation 
assessment, communications, planning, public affairs, and logistics support.  Perhaps 
most importantly, this research asserts that the On-Scene Commanders Course could 
provide valuable joint training with minor modifications in delivery and content.  In 
addition, this course is already presented in mobile format for agencies sponsoring on-site 
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seminars.  This paper also posited a spectrum of assistance that could make this course 
available to a broader audience:  1) Increase capacity at Air University to accommodate 
additional in-residence attendees; 2) Increase use of mobile training teams to deliver 
course to sponsoring agencies; 3) Create a distance learning curriculum; 4) Make course 
materials available to other agencies to use as they see fit.  This continuum would create 
a wide variety of options for agencies to increase their joint training and crisis 
management skills. 
Since the post-conflict literature revealed the prevalence of security and 
infrastructure concerns, the final major area of inquiry reviewed the Air Force’s 
organizational structure to determine how these issues are addressed within the Air Force.  
This research found that Mission Support Group Commanders were in a unique 
leadership position to address many of the security and infrastructure concerns found in 
the post-conflict literature.  The leadership in security and infrastructure issues was found 
primarily to be a function of how the Air Force has developed it Combat Wing Structure.  
In addition, these senior officers attend the On-Scene Commanders Course as a 
prerequisite for assumption of command.  Therefore, Mission Support Group 
Commanders were found to occupy a unique nexus of training and experience that could 
be applicable to post-conflict environments.  With these senior leaders identified, five 
major areas of analysis were utilized to further assess a potential new mission area for 
these officers.  First, the research revealed a significant pool of expertise: 76 current 
commanders and an additional 165 that have completed their command tours.  Second, 
this group of commanders was found to have significant experience in Mission Support 
Group-related duties, with an average of 13.7 years.  In addition, these commanders were 
found to have significant prior command and leadership experience with more than 50 
percent receiving below the zone promotions.  The third area of analysis revealed a 
significant amount of joint agency experience, a possible indicator of the ability to 
coordinate the work of disparate agencies.  This integrative skill finds parallels in the 
post-conflict literature and is a skill-set that would serve well during stabilization 
operations.  The fourth area of the research considered the availability of these officers 
after their command tour.  The study found that the average Mission Support Group 
Commander has an average of 5.84 years left in their career to potentially serve in 
54 
stabilization operations.  The final area of assessment revealed these officers to be highly 
educated, with 100 percent of the officers having advanced academic degrees with 75 
percent having two or more advanced degrees. 
B.  UNTAPPED AIR FORCE RESOURCES FOR STABILIZATION AND 
RECONSTRUCTION OPERATIONS 
This research has revealed Air Force training and personnel resources that can be 
brought to bear on a significant portion of U.S. national security strategy dealing with 
post-conflict environments.  Although the Air Force is not the lead agent for stability 
operations, there are currently resources in the Air Force inventory that can make positive 
contributions to the U.S. effort.  Specifically, the On-Scene Commander’s Course is a 
training resource that answers many of the concerns regarding the need for greater 
civilian-military integration and training and education of personnel involved in stability 
operations.  In addition, Air Force Mission Support Group Commanders appear to be 
resource that could be valuable in post-conflict environments.  They are the primary 
senior officers responsible for security and infrastructures at their installations and they 
are perhaps the most capable at integrating the various response agencies typically 
involved in post-conflict contingency operations.  This group of officers are also required 
to attend the On-Scene Commander’s Course as part of their duties as Mission Support 
Group Commanders.  Both examples appear to address the major concerns of the post-
conflict literature.  This research hopes to begin a substantive debate in the Air Force 
regarding post-conflict operations.  Leveraging these Air Force assets means an increased 
chance for success in a significant area of U.S. national security policy.  In addition, 
resources and personnel can only be used most efficiently with a complete review of all 
resources.  Perhaps most importantly, a thorough resource review can lead to a reduction 
of U.S. personnel placed in harm’s way.  In the end, a larger debate is needed to begin to 
answer the wicked problem of post-conflict operations.103 
                                                 
103 Roberts, 353-375.  See also note 2. 
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